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Abstract: While methodologists have provided us ample notice of both the problem of
non-proportional hazards and the means of correcting for them, less attention has been
paid to the post-estimation interpretation. The suggested inclusion of time interactions in
our models is more than a statistical fix: these corrections alter the substantive meaning
and interpretation of results. Framing the issue as a specific case of multiplicativeinteraction modeling, I provide detailed discussion of the problem of non-proportional
hazards and present several appropriate means of interpreting both the substantive impact
and the significance of variables whose effects may change over time.
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1. Introduction:
In the last decade, Box-Steffensmeier and colleagues produced several
explications of non-proportional hazards (NPH) as a serious statistical issue in event
history analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001; Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter and Zorn
2003; Box-Steffenesmeier and Jones 2004). As a result, models fitted for NPH became
more common in the literature of all major subfields (e.g. Chiozza and Goemans 2004;
Meinke 2005; Golub 2007; Golub and Steunenberg 2007; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and
Joyce 2008; Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied 2009). Correcting for NPH through the
inclusion of time interactions for variables in violation of the proportional hazards
assumption (PHA), however, is more than a quick statistical fix; it complicates the
interpretation of statistical results and calls for more advanced post-estimation
techniques. With the notable exception of Golub and Steunenberg (2007), little attention
has been devoted to this aspect of NPH. Building on those authors’ effort, I outline
below three interpretation strategies which fit the bill. The simulation procedures I
propose provide superior ability to report the substantive importance of continuous
variables’ NPH effects and appropriate information regarding uncertainty around those
effects.1
Many analysts find interpreting the results of the NPH Cox model difficult. What
does it mean, for instance, when the constitutive term’s coefficient fits the hypothesis but
the time interaction does not? Is the hypothesis supported, refuted or neither? What is
the actual estimated effect of this variable, and how can we best convey it to the reader?
Political scientists must answer these questions, because many of our hypotheses involve
precisely the type of dynamic social processes likely to create NPH.
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Acknowledging NPH corrections as a special case of multiplicative-interaction
modeling, we can utilize existing knowledge to address these questions (see also Golub
and Steunenberg 2007). As with any interaction effect, appropriate interpretation
methods include the calculation of marginal effects and first differences (Brambor, Clark
and Golder 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007). Extant software add-ons and guides,
however, do not accommodate the complex, nonlinear Cox model.2
Discussion proceeds below with a brief review of the PHA and the proper
interpretation of interaction effects. I then present the calculations for measures of
substantive interest in the NPH Cox model and outline three methods for proper
interpretation of non-proportional effects. Finally, I demonstrate the merits of these
strategies through replication of NPH Cox models from three published papers covering
civil war duration (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008), directive approval in the European Union
(Golub and Steuenenberg 2007), and U.S. Congresspersons’ tendency to switch positions
on recurrent issues (Meinke 2005). The broad substantive range of these studies
illustrates the widespread need for attention to nonproportionally time-dependent
processes in our expectations and our empirical models.

2. The Proportional Hazards Assumption and Political Science
The proportional hazards assumption (PHA) is embedded in the logic of the
standard Cox duration model. To see this property consider the formula for its hazard:
()

()

,

(Eq. 1)

where i denotes each observation i= 1…n; t is a point in time; β is the vector of
coefficient estimates and Xi is the vector of covariates. No matter the value of the linear
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index, Xiβ, the form of the function dictates that risk of failure at each point in time shifts
“proportionally” by the baseline, h0. This issue may be more clearly visible in the hazard
ratio function, which expresses the risks of failure for a given case i relative to that of
another case j.
( )⁄ ( )

(

)

.

(Eq. 2)

The effect of covariates X may shift from one unit of time to the next (e.g. from day one
to day two, or from day ten to eleven), but always by this single, proportional quantity.
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004, 132) warn: “Theoretically, one would be
suspicious of the [PHA] if there was reason to expect that the effect of a covariate
changes over time”.3 As political scientists, our suspicions regarding the PHA should be
aroused more often than not. While the term “non-proportional hazards” sounds esoteric,
situations giving rise to it abound. If we argue that experience makes people better at
their jobs, that the effectiveness, tenability and legitimacy of institutions increases with
age, that actors in competition send signals and adjust their strategies in response to each
other, that new ideas gather force from their transmission until reaching an important
threshold, then we are arguing that key covariates’ effects will change over time. If these
dynamic trends do not modify the effects of all covariates equiproportionally over time,
then the proportional hazards assumption will not hold. Essentially, the nature of the
political processes of learning, institutionalization, strategic developments and
information transmission which interest us as a discipline are likely to produce frequent
violations of the PHA.
Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) theory of international norm life-cycles, for
example, hypothesizes a predictable, increasing trend in the power of norms to alter
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actors’ behavior as they become internalized over time. Models of norm-efficacy
typically pit the importance of ideas against that of power and strategic interests. While
norms strengthen over time, geopolitics and physical power will exert either static or
decreasing pressure on international actors. Another widely known theory posits
operation of a “generational effect” on the repugnance for war within a society; the
grandchildren of soldiers tend to romanticize warfare, having suffered none of its costs
directly (Wright 1942; Toynbee 1972). This would produce a pattern of decreasing
likelihood of conflict following a traumatic war, the magnitude of which would decay
over time until the opposite effect would ultimately surface with the growing influence of
hawkish grandchildren. While the worldview of the citizens follows this dynamic path,
the strongest determinants of international war – territory and rivalry – will likely retain
effects of the same direction and magnitude over time.
Theories which imply effects likely to violate the PHA also exist in comparative
and American politics. Light’s (1999) analysis of the American presidency posits two
competing, simultaneous dynamic processes. The first is an increasing trend in
presidential competence over time: all presidents learn on the job and all presidents try to
improve over time. The second is a decreasing stock of political capital: as time passes,
presidential approval inevitably declines as opposition criticism increases. Unless these
dynamics shifted proportionally with the effects of all other covariates included, they
would certainly violate any event-history analysis of a president’s efficiency and
effectiveness assuming proportional hazards.4 The opposing direction of these dynamics
likely increases the odds that any model attempting to account for both will violate the
PHA.
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In comparative politics, the study of electoral institutions’ effects on voter
behavior and electoral outcomes ranks among the oldest and most prolific research
agendas (e.g. Cox 1997; Duverger 1954). The equilibrium behaviors suggested by
different electoral institutions, however, cannot be expected to materialize instantly.
Voters require time and experience with a new system to determine how to vote
“strategically”; the effect of institutions on behavior, then, will change over time as
voters observe the results of their actions (e.g. Wittrock 2008). Theories of political party
emergence and competition also posit dynamic learning and institutionalization processes
which would produce changing effects over time (e.g. Kitschelt 1989; Downs 1997).
Inglehart’s modernization thesis predicts a changing effect of economic development and
democratic government on a host of questions over the course of time (e.g. Inglehart and
Welzel 2005). In all three cases, these institutional changes take place in a context of
perhaps stickier cultural and geographical effects. Individual-level explanations of voterbehavior, also, must contend with the generally more static effects of partisan
identification, race and gender. If these theories hold, then we should expect the effects
of some variables in event-history models of voting behavior to change over time.
Because of the mixture of social processes and structural effects, it seems unlikely that all
these effects will shift proportionally over time.
The examples above outline reasons to believe the PHA will be violated in many
analyses within all major branches of political science research. When the PHA is
violated without correction, systematic bias in coefficient estimates results: the effects of
variables with NPH are overestimated while the hazard rate increases and underestimated
while it decreases. Moreover, if the effects of such variables change from positive to
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negative over time (or vice versa) the violation of the PHA may result in a Type II error,
declaring the effects insignificant when they in fact have a conditionally significant, but
changing, effect (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 132). Statisticians have developed
strategies for assessing the violation of the PHA in the Cox model, notably including the
schoenfeld residuals test (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002, 977). This test is easily
implemented in statistical packages.
Box-Steffensmeier and colleagues recommend a simple response to significant
results of the Schoenfeld residuals test: model the relationship between covariates and
time by including interaction terms, relating the two by some standard function (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones 2004, 136), most commonly the natural log of time (BoxSteffensmeier and Zorn 2002, 978; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 136; BoxSteffensmeier et al. 2003). Inclusion of these multiplicative-interaction terms alongside
the constitutive term allows estimation of both the initial effect and the over-time changes
in effect.5 The proliferation of interactions, however, substantially complicates
interpretation of results.
Of course, this is no reason to eschew appropriate model specification. The
analyst must take care to assess, anticipate, and evaluate deviations from the PHA and
model these trends appropriately, recognizing that inclusion of multiplicative-interaction
terms alters the meaning of the estimated coefficients and standard errors. Since
Friedrich’s (1982) essay on the subject, many other social scientists have written in
defense of multiplicative modeling and detailed the issues it raises regarding
interpretation and reporting uncertainty (see Jaccard and Turrisi 2003; Brambor et al.
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2006; Kam and Franzese 2007). The current wisdom on the interpretation of
multiplicative-interactions will be briefly reviewed in the next section.

3. The Interpretation of Multiplicative Models
As Kam and Franzese (2007, 20) bluntly pronounce, “... coefficients [on
constitutive and interaction terms] are not effects”; they are not as readily interpretable as
in purely additive-separable linear regression. The constitutive terms’ coefficients tell us
the effect of that variable when the other interacting variable(s) is (are) equal to zero.
Accordingly, “… rather than being constant (as they are in the additive model), the
standard errors of the conditional coefficients vary according to the level of the other
independent variable” (Friedrich 1982, 810).6 With the proliferation of non-linear
modeling techniques, quantitative political scientists have become accustomed to
performing minor transformations, such as retrieving the odds-ratio or calculating
predicted probabilities, to retrieve substantively meaningful quantities from their
regression coefficients. Inclusion of interaction effects introduces a similar need for
additional post-estimation calculations (Friedrich 1982; Ai and Norton 2003; Brambor et
al. 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007). Obviously, we would like to know about our
independent variables’ impact on the dependent variable at more than just one (possibly
rare, non-existent, or even illogical) value of the other factor. Political methodologists
forward two useful strategies for obtaining such information: marginal effects and first
differences (see Brambor et al. 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007).
The marginal effect of a covariate, X1, which has been interacted with another
covariate, X2, is the first derivative of the likelihood function, ∂Y/∂X1. In the linear
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regression case, the marginal impact of an increase in X at a specific point is simply the
sum of the effect of X1 when X2 is zero (i.e. the constitutive term coefficient) and the the
product of the interaction term coefficient and the value of X2 (see Friedrich 1982;
Brambor et al. 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007).7 ∂Y/∂X1 is, by definition, the change in
the dependent variable for a marginal change in the independent variable. In other words,
marginal effects tell us the change in Y for an arbitrarily small change in X1.
The information necessary for calculation of marginal effects and their standard
errors for most models is easily attained using modern statistical software. Brambor et al.
(2006) provide template code for the necessary procedure for linear regression and binary
dependent variable models, which should allow even inexperienced programmers to
obtain appropriate results and present them graphically.8 The grinter utility, written
for Stata by Boehmke, allows analysts to produce equivalent graphics with even less
effort.9
When X1 is an ordinal or nominal variable, however, the marginal effect approach
can be an unduly abstract means of communicating results. Kam and Franzese (2007, 25)
and King et al. (2000) thus recommend differences in predicted probability as an
alternative. A first differences approach calculates the change in the dependent variable
as the independent variable moves from one discrete value to another, taking bigger steps
than the marginal changes underlying differentiation. The first difference may be
calculated for unit changes or for substantively interesting intervals (e.g. from the
minimum to the mean). Standard errors and first differences from many models can be
calculated using the guidelines available in Kam and Franzese (2007, 89) or with King et
al.’s (2000) Clarify software for Stata.
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4. Interpretation Strategies for the NPH Cox Model
Calculating appropriate marginal effects and standard errors for the NPH Cox
model may be daunting for many political scientists, due to the complex, nonlinear
functions involved. Under conditions of nonproportional hazards, an estimate of the
Cox hazard rate for case j at time t is,
()

(

( )

)

( ).

(Eq. 3)

The exponential term gives the sensitivity of the hazard to covariates, X and Z; unlike in
the standard PHA model, the non-proportionally time-dependent effects of X are modeled
by the interaction of X with log time. The baseline hazard rate, h0(t) is the probability
that a case will fail at time t, a value which is assigned equally to all cases j which are
still “at risk” (i.e. which have not yet failed). To recover this quantity, we must calculate
the likelihood of a case j remaining in the risk set, R, at time t=ti. That likelihood is then
subtracted from one to yield the baseline hazard for the time threshold t=ti:
̂ ( )

∑

( )

(

( )

)

.

(Eq. 4) 10

Even in this simplest possible scenario which includes only one PHA-violating effect and
a single level interaction, taking the derivative with respect to X produces a complex
function.11 As the number of PHA-violating effects proliferates, the difficulty of
calculating this function and its standard error will increase. Happily, those who wish to
avoid the time and effort necessary to calculate the true marginal effect may do so by
following Golub and Steunenberg’s (2007) example.
Golub and Steunenberg (2007) utilize a helpful algebraic manipulation. By
constructing a ratio of the hazards of two hypothetical cases i and j that differ only with
respect to the value of the covariate X, we can define, at time t=t,
9
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(Eq. 5).12

This hazard ratio transformation removes the ungainly mathematical issues raised by the
baseline hazard, thus dramatically reducing the difficulty of the calculations needed to
interpret the role of variables whose effects change over time.
Golub and Steunenberg (2007) utilize two further simplified measures. First, they
discuss a special case of the hazard ratio, constructed such that the covariate X in the
hypothetical observation j equals zero. Under this condition, the hazard ratio simplifies:
( )⁄ ( )

(

( ))

(Eq. 6).

The authors refer to this quantity as the relative hazard. When X is binary, it describes
the change in hazard when the variable in question is “switched on”. When X is
continuous, it gives the change in the hazard resultant from a jump to X=xi≠0 from X=0.
Secondly, Golub and Steunenberg (2007) examine the combined coefficient, (β1 +
β2ln(t)),13 which relates to the contribution of Xi to the hazard rate (via the model's
exponential-function transformation) over the range of time Analysts can easily obtain
accurate standard errors for this quantity, because the well-known formula for the
variance of a sum of random variables used in the linear-interaction context applies (see
Friedrich 1982, Brambor et al. 2006, Kam and Franzese 2007). However, reporting
uncertainty regarding the relative hazard in Equation 6 is nearly as simple.
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[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Exponentation creates the relative hazard as a monotonically increasing function
of the combined coefficient. While the variance of the relative hazard will be greater
than the variance of the combined coefficient, its distribution will correspond to that of its
referent. Figure 1 charts a relative hazard against its non-exponentiated form.14 The
reference lines indicate key points in the distribution of both variables, the fifth, fiftieth
and ninety-fifth percentiles. The 90% confidence interval around the relative hazard can
be recovered by exponentiating the corresponding confidence bounds around the
combined coefficient.15
The combined coefficient and relative hazards approaches provide viable and
easily implemented means of evaluating the effects of time-dependent variables. They
allow evaluation of statistical significance across the full range of time and
straightforward reporting of estimation uncertainty. In terms of relating the substantive
importance of an effect, however, these methods, as employed by Golub and Steunenberg
(2007), may fall short. The combined coefficient describes the direction and magnitude
of the variable’s effect on the hazard rate over time at a specific value (usually xi=1) held
constant over time. While interesting, this quantity is abstract. It may not tell us whether
the variable exerts a substantively notable impact and it cannot reflect movement in the
variable over time.
The relative hazard (see Eq 6) offers a more substantive interpretation for binary
NPH effects, describing the difference in hazard given an X-unit change in the variable of
interest. With a continuous X, however, this measure may have less substantive appeal.
The relative hazard requires a shift to some value X=xi, from xj=0, a value which may be
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meaningless or impossible. The effect of a continuous, X which has been interacted with
a function of time depends on the specific value xi which is being used as well as the
value of time. A single calculation of the relative hazard, or combined coefficient will
not suffice to describe the full content. Consistent with the general good practice of
utilizing either first differences or marginal effects to interpret continuous-variable
interaction effects, I propose two simple simulation techniques appropriate for evaluating
continuous NPH effects.
The first method for dealing with non-binary, time-dependent effects returns to
the hazard ratio expressed in Equation 5. The hazard ratio can be utilized in this
previously presented form, or, as recommended by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004,
60), transformed into a percentage change in hazard rate for added substantive appeal.
Adopting the notation in use here, the percentage change in hazard rate at time t=t can be
calculated as:
()

(
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)

( ) (
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)
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(Eq. 7).

This formula simplifies:
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(Eq. 8).

As this measure closely resembles a traditional first difference in interpretation, I will
refer to it as the first differences method rather than as a change in hazard ratio. For a
given change in X, the effect is null when Eq. 8 is statistically indistinguishable from
zero, rather than from one. Xi and Xj can be selected to provide a good measure of
12

substantive significance. When the effect of X is suspected to change substantially across
its range of values, it may be wise to calculate a first difference at multiple values of Xi
and Xj. The replication of Meinke’s (2005) vote-switching study below provides an
example of this situation.
A simple simulation process can ease the calculation of confidence intervals
around either the hazard ratio or the first difference. As in King et al.’s (2000) Clarify
software, a large number of ̂ can be drawn from a multivariate Normal distribution with
mean and variance taken from the parameter and parameter-covariance estimates of the
NPH Cox model. This procedure approximates the sampling distribution of ̂ , allowing
us to present the best estimates complete with confidence bounds at the desired level as
follows:
1. Create a dataset with T observations, and generate values of time T=[t1…tT];16
2. Draw vector of ̂ using the parameter and covariance estimates;
3. Calculate the desired first difference (Equation 8) or hazard ratio (Equation 5);
4. Repeat steps 1-3 N times;
5. Preserve median and percentile values appropriate to desired confidence level for
each T=ti and (Xi-Xj).17
A second strategy for interpreting a continuous, PHA-violating effect calculates
the relative hazard (Equation 6) at many values of X and across the range of time. This
can be accomplished with the following steps:
1. Create a dataset with T observations, and generate values of time T=[t1…tT];
2. Draw a vector of ̂ using the parameter and covariance estimates;
3. Calculate the relative hazard (Equation 6) at value xi of X;
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4. Repeat steps 1-3 N times;
5. Repeat steps 1-4 at some, many, or all interesting values of X, compiling results
in one dataset;
6. Preserve median and percentiles appropriate to desired confidence level for each
T=ti and X=xi.
These simulation procedures will generate the median and upper and lower
percentiles of the “confidence interval” for the measure at each combination of time and
covariate values. The measure and confidence bounds can then be charted against time to
present a graphical summary of the effects’ substantive and statistical significance.
While a few studies have utilized these or similar means of interpretation (e.g. BoxSteffensmeier and Zorn 2001; Golub and Steunenberg 2007; Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied
2009), the appropriate processes have not been elaborated transparently, which may have
abetted the continued confusion across most empirical, political science research. In the
next sections I hope to dispel this remaining confusion, first by discussing selection of a
proper measure for interpreting NPH Cox models, and providing tips for hypothesis
testing. The following replication of three empirical studies will provide further details
and examples.
5. Substantive Interpretation of Non-Proportional Effects in the Cox Model
Interpreting PHA-violating effects requires fulfillment of four tasks: (1)
calculation of the variable’s effect, (2) evaluation of that effect over time, (3) substantive
assessment of that effect, and (4) incorporation of uncertainty. Above, I recommended
three measures of substantive significance which can fulfill these criteria: the hazard

14

ratio (Equation 5), the first difference (Equation 8), and the relative hazard (Equation
6).18
Though each measure brings helpful attributes to interpretation, the differences
between them are cosmetic. Subtracting one and multiplying by 100 changes the relative
hazard in Equation 6 into the %Δhi(t) in Equation 8 (if Xi-Xj=1). Similarly, the hazard
ratio in Equation 5 and the relative hazard differ simply by the value assigned to Xj:
when Xj=0, the relative hazard and hazard ratio are equal. If the change in X remains
equal, identical conclusions will be drawn regarding statistical significance.
This mathematical equivalence allows the analyst to choose the most appropriate
tool for his/her own presentational purposes. The two simulation procedures outlined
above work well for continuous variables, but would be unnecessary for a PHA-violating
effect which stems from a dichotomous variable. Because a change of less than one unit
makes little sense for a binary variable, the hazard ratio simplifies to the relative hazard.
Using simulation procedures to calculate the confidence intervals would be unnecessarily
time-consuming.19
For continuous PHA-violating effects, choosing between the hazard ratio
(Equation 5) and the first difference (Equation 8) will be driven more by stylistic
preference and intuitive appeal than by efficiency. For example, in studies of
international and civil conflict, a hazard ratio could report a raw change in the hazard of
war onset as a tiny number. Given the low probability of interstate war, however, the
relative change may be huge. In such cases, the analyst may believe a percentage change
more accurately reflects substantive importance.20
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Before embarking on the full process of calculating substantive measures, one
may begin interpreting NPH Cox results through the returned coefficients. The
constitutive coefficient relates to the effect of the variable when the log of time equals
zero (i.e. when the time counter equals one). As most hypotheses do not specifically
refer to t=1, and since the scaling of the time counter is arbitrary,21 analysts must take
care: a correctly signed constitutive coefficient need not translate to hypothesis support.
The fate of our hypotheses rests largely with the overtime trend. When the interaction
term holds the same sign as the constitutive coefficient, the initial effect magnifies over
time. Commonly, however, the trend opposes the constitutive effect. Though often
interpreted as “decay” in the original effect, this need not imply that the effect of a
variable is “wearing off” over time (Golub and Steuenenberg 2007). The overtime trend
may swamp the initial effect, both statistically and substantively.
The relative size and sign of the interaction and constitutive terms’ coefficients
indicate the rate at which X’s effect moves over time. A small (large) interaction term
coefficient relative to the constitutive term coefficient indicates slow (fast) change.
When the coefficients have opposing signs, exponentiating the ratio of the coefficients
provides the value of time when the estimated effect flips from positive to negative or
vice versa (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 1998, 17). More precisely, that value, Tf, is:
|
|

|
|

(Eq. 9).

Locating Tf on the distribution of failure times allows evaluation of the proportion of
cases experiencing estimated effects in either direction. Chiozza and Goemans (2004,
610), for example, use this method to demonstrate that the institutional instability of
mixed regimes heightens leaders’ risks of losing office for the first 17 years, at which
16

point the estimated effect changes sign. Because 17 years is an extremely long time to
hang onto office, the destabilizing effect applies to most mixed-regime leaders. Here Tf
reveals some interesting, hypothesis-relevant information.22 Evaluating coefficients,
then, can be helpful, but these strategies tell us nothing about how the variables’ effects
evolve over time. The replications below illustrate the added benefit of utilizing the
approaches discussed in Section 4.

5.1 Replication: Golub and Steunenberg (2007)
Golub and Steunenberg (2007) examine the duration of European Union (EU)
deliberation on directives. Findings related to two key independent variables will be
reviewed here: qualified majority voting (QMV) and legislative backlog.23 Table 1
displays the successful replication of Golub’s original (2007) analysis.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Figure 2 demonstrates the relationship between the relative hazard and firstdifferences approaches for binary NPH effects. The left-hand panel replicates Golub and
Steunenberg’s figure (2007, 561), charting the relative hazard of QMV pre- and postSingle European Act across deliberation time. The right panel displays the firstdifferences strategy. Comparing across the Y-axis confirms the first difference curves
differ from the relative hazard curves by exactly one unit.24 Substantively, proposals not
requiring unanimity clear faster, with QMV-eligible legislation initially 300% more
likely to be settled than with unanimity required. The voting rule matters most in the
early stages of deliberation; contentious proposals prolong the process, regardless of
rules.
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[FIGURE 2 HERE]
To interpret the effect of backlogged legislation, Golub and Steunenberg (2007,
560) calculate its combined coefficient at several points in time, holding the backlog
itself constant at one.25 Using this technique, the authors conclude that the very small
effect of legislative backlogs achieves statistical but not substantive significance.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Unfortunately, this strategy is somewhat misleading regarding the substance of
the estimated effect. The combined coefficient relates only the effect of one backlogged
item, an unlikely situation for any regularly operating legislative body. The EU backlog
averaged 169 pieces during the observation time. To test the backlog’s impact on
deliberation speed at more realistic values, I used Equation 6 and the simulation process
above to chart its relative hazard from the minimum to the maximum. This strategy
produced Figure 3, in which shaded bars demarcate the range between the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles of estimated relative hazards. Lighter shading indicates larger backlogs. The
thin black line and hollow diamonds highlight the median estimated relative hazard of
one backlogged item, which represents Golub and Steunenberg’s (2007, 560) strategy. I
split the figure to ease evaluation of the two periods of significant effects.
Backlog impact increases as legislation accumulates. Compared to the
hypothetical effect which Golub and Steunenberg (2007) evaluated, even the smallest
observed backlog of less than 40 pieces of legislation exerts a powerful initial
acceleration in deliberation. At this value, the likelihood of proposals being handled in
the first days is 50% higher than if there were no backlog. When the backlog approaches
the mean, the relative hazard nears a 500% increase. Over time, the escalatory effect of
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the backlog declines, becoming statistically insignificant for a three year range (including
the mean and modal durations).26 For more controversial pieces of legislation, however,
average or larger backlogs may further prolong deliberations. Combining an average
backlog with a long deliberation produces a likelihood of settlement less than half that of
a similar bill given no backlog.27 Such a significant negative impact suggests that a large
queue of work not only fails to “… expedite passage of the most controversial pieces of
legislation” (Golub and Steunenberg 2007, 564), but can actually retard those processes.

5.2 Replication: Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008)
Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008) study the effect of external intervention on the
likelihood of civil war termination via government victory, opposition victory or
negotiated settlement. Table 2 presents the successfully replicated results of their NPH
Cox model with competing risks. Discussion below focuses on the key factor in the
original analysis – intervention on behalf of the government.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
This replication provides an example of a common question in NPH Cox
evaluation: how to evaluate hypotheses when constituent coefficients and time
interactions defy expectations. Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008) predict a positive relationship
between intervention and government victory, and a negative relationship between
intervention and negotiated settlements. The estimated constitutive term coefficients,
however, are positive and significant in both columns: intervention in favor of the
government increases the likelihood of both outcomes at time ln(t)=0, which is, here, the
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first day of a civil war. The negative, significant interaction terms suggest a changing
effect, leading us to the overtime trend.
Figure 4 charts the combined coefficients for pro-government intervention over
time. 28 The thick lines indicate the combined coefficient for pro-government
intervention in each model, with thin lines marking the 90% confidence intervals. 29 The
dashed curves depict the density of civil war duration times.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
The left-hand panel displays intervention’s effect on the likelihood of government
victory. The rate of change in effect quickly drags the initially positive estimated effect
into negative territory. This negative effect becomes significant at the 90% level at day
286 of civil war duration. Only about 15% of in-sample civil wars terminate before this
date, suggesting that intervention negatively impacts the likelihood of government
victory in most civil wars. Exponentiating the combined coefficient at day 286 reveals a
relative hazard of e-1.2=.30; civil wars with intervention experience a 70% reduction in the
likelihood of government victory. The negative effect continues to grow over time,
topping out at an estimated 95% reduction at the longest observed duration time.
The right-hand panel of Figure 4 displays the effect of intervention on the
likelihood of negotiated settlements. Contrary to the authors’ prediction, the effect never
achieves significance. At the 90% threshold, its confidence bounds include zero for the
entire duration of the longest observation time. Charting the full effect of this timedependent variable in both equations, then, reveals findings contradictory to expectations.
[FIGURE 5 HERE]
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Figure 5 replicates the first reported figure from Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008, 358),
allowing comparison of interpretation techniques. Figure 5 plots the predicted survival
probability of each competing outcome with pro-government intervention turned on. The
authors note that the figure illustrates “… a third-party intervention on the side of the
government has a different effect on the expected probability of a civil war surviving past
a given point in time for each civil war outcome” (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008, 356). The
graph does suggest a much higher probability of government victory or negotiated
settlement than of opposition victory. This apparent effect, however, cannot be safely
attributed to the pro-government intervention. Plotting the coefficient, as in Figure 4,
reveals that any increase in the chances of these outcomes could or should be attributed to
some other shared characteristic: the only significant effect which intervention exerts on
these termination types is negative.

5.3 Replication: Meinke (2005)
The dynamic nature of Congressional politics in Meinke’s (2005) analysis turns
our attention to the NPH model’s benefits for political science. Meinke (2005) specifies
a NPH Cox model of vote-switches regarding the minimum wage. Table 3 contains the
successfully replicated results.30 We will re-evaluate two variables: an indicator for
losing the executive and a continuous measure of electoral security (the incumbent’s
mean-centered share of the vote).
[TABLE 3 HERE]
[FIGURE 6 HERE]
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For the binary PHA-violating effect of losing the White House, charting the
relative hazard, as in Figure 6, displays both statistical and substantive significance. For
freshman congresspersons, a change in presidential party coincides with an estimated
100% increase in risk of switching. After this year, the effect of a change in executive
control diminishes by half. Within three years, it loses statistical significance.31 This
precipitous decline could result from establishment of visible voting records, or from
strategy-shifts towards constituent relations rather than partylines.
The time-varying effect of electoral security illustrates the value of fully charting
continuous NPH effects. Though the coefficient on the interaction term falls short of
traditional significance thresholds, we should remember this information relates a
conditional effect: the average shift in effect per unit of time. The specific values of both
continuous interacted variables – time and margin of victory – will affect significance of
the combined effect. Before abandoning the hypothesis, we should chart electoral
security’s effect at multiple values of both variables. The resulting patterns (see Figure
7) demonstrate one circumstance under which coefficients alone may be misleading.
Here, the divergent behavior of very secure and very insecure new members has canceled
out the aggregate finding.
[FIGURE 7 HERE]
The shaded bars in Figure 7 indicate the interval between the upper and lower
95% bounds from the simulated sample of relative hazards. I selected a range of
interesting values of security, victory by 5%, 25%, 75%, and 99%.32 As mean-centering
sets the average to zero the relative hazard will compare these values to the mean. As
Meinke (2005, 109-113) expected, congresspersons enjoying a wider than average
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margin of victory are more likely to switch their positions. However, the approximately
50% increase in hazard, which he reported, does not hold over time. The negative trend
rapidly pulls the combined effect into statistically insignificant territory, from which it
does not re-emerge. The original argument, then, receives qualified support: safer
representatives are more likely to switch their votes only very early in their careers.
Moreover, highly insecure congresspersons exhibit the opposite behavior, with initial
relative hazards half the size of those at the mean level of security.
[FIGURE 8 HERE]
Figure 8 provides an alternative depiction, charting the first differences of two
hypothetical changes in electoral security. The solid black line gives the median
percentage difference in hazard of switching for an increase from a very comfortable win
to an uncontested race. The solid gray line marks the corresponding difference were the
candidate’s margin to decrease from the comfortable win to a victory by plurality.33 The
thin, dashed lines of corresponding color mark the 5th and 95th percentiles from a
simulated distribution of 1,000.34 Running uncontested increases the probability of
switching by 20% compared to a comfortable victory. The displayed difference for a
move from comfort to tough competition shows a symmetrical decrease of 20%.35 For
both cases, the impact of vote margin “wears off” quickly, dropping out of significance
within less than six months.
The establishment of reputations and voting records may produce this dynamic
pattern. Super comfortable new representatives may not fear electoral reprisal, but over
time they become reticent to change position, viewing continued success as support for
their policies (Meinke 2009, personal communication). For an embattled new
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representative, establishing a reputation for honesty and holding onto the existing base
will dominate strategy, producing the lower initial likelihood of switching positions.

6. Conclusion
The replications above address a wide selection of substantive interests. The link
between legislative deliberations, civil war duration and vote choice may seem obscure.
It is, however, deep and fundamental: all three describe a political process in which the
causal role of explanatory factors is dynamically contingent. As political scientists, we
are inherently interested in how these and other complex interactions unfold over time.
The NPH Cox model provides an opportunity to develop statistical tests better suited to
such social processes, but it requires the commitment of additional post-estimation effort.
In each replication study, such an effort added richness to key findings and more
thorough evaluation of hypotheses. Appropriate application of these hazard ratio, relative
hazards and first differences strategies will provide the necessary follow-through for
scholars of civil war, legislative bodies, political position-taking, and the myriad other
time-dependent processes fundamental to political science research.
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Table 1. Replication of NPH Cox Model of EU DecisionMaking Speed in Golub (2007)
Qualified Majority Voting
3.1218***
(QMV)
(0.4784)
QMV After Single European Act
2.1096***
(SEA)
(0.5127)
0.4134**
QMV After Maastricht
(0.1657)
-6.0408***
Cooperation Procedure
(0.6135)
-5.0008***
Codecision Procedure
(0.8763)
0.4962**
EU with 9 members
(0.1984)
0.4569*
EU with 10 members
(0.2429)
0.6589**
EU with 12 members
(0.2569)
0.5706**
EU with 15 members
(0.2625)
-1.7162***
Thatcher (as Prime Minister)
(0.3794)
0.1774
Expanded Legislative Agenda
(0.1914)
0.0260***
Legislative Backlog
(0.0066)
-0.4281***
QMV ln(t)
(0.0793)
-0.2239***
QMV after SEA ln(t)
(0.0846)
0.8904***
Cooperation ln(t)
(0.0992)
0.7251***
Codecision ln(t)
(0.1342)
0.2819***
Thatcher ln(t)
(0.0611)
-0.0040***
Legislative Backlog ln(t)
(0.0009)
NOTE: 3,001 observations of 1,669 separate pieces of
legislation. Data are right-censored on 17 December 1999.
For more information on variables see Golub (2007). Standard
errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2. Replication of Competing Risks Cox Model of Civil War Termination in BalchLindsay et al. (2008)
Government
Opposition Victory
Negotiated
Victory
Settlement
Intervention Supporting
2.49†
1.93
5.67†
Government
(1.83)
(1.63)
(3.79)
Intervention for
Government*ln(time)
Intervention Supporting
Opposition
Balanced Intervention

Economic
Development*ln(time)
Binary Measure of
Democracy
Civil Wars
Civil War Failures
Time at risk
Spells
Log-Likelihood

-0.63**
(0.27)
-1.64
(1.12)
1.748†
(1.34)
0.87
(1.05)
-0.22
(0.18)
108.67
(204.70)
-34.67
(38.05)
-1.30***
(0.51)
0.96***
(0.15)
-0.17***
(0.02)
0.33
(0.33)
213
109
249,462
924
-427.88

-0.43**
(0.23)
1.74***
(0.48)
-32.60***
(1.06)
0.10
(1.71)
-0.18
(0.26)
171.25***
(62.88)
-33.56***
(11.80)
-0.66
(0.58)
0.93***
(0.22)
-0.18***
(0.04)
-0.34
(0.53)
213
45
249,462
924
-174.45

-0.75†
(0.50)
1.39**
(0.56)
-2.63**
(1.21)
8.16***
(2.93)
-1.23***
(0.41)
-211.75†
(158.26)
25.08
(20.40)
0.16
(0.62)
0.51†
(0.37)
-0.08†
(0.05)
-1.19
(1.22)
213
40
249,462
924
-132.85

Wald χ2 (12,12,12)

80.54***

3,393.58***

36.16***

Separatist
Separatist*ln(time)
War Costs
War Costs*ln(time)
GovReputation
Economic Development

NOTE: Data are from Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008). Figures reported are coefficients
from the Cox model. Positive coefficients indicate a decrease in duration (increase in risk); negative
numbers an increase in duration (decrease in risk). Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
Significance (two-tailed): ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Significance (one-tailed): † significant at 10%
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Table 3. Replication of NPH Cox Model of Vote Switching on Issue of Minimum Wage in the
U.S. Congress in Meinke (2005)
Party (1=Democrat)
Crosspressuring (1=Crosspressured)
White House Change to Member’s Party
What House Change from Member’s Party
Union Membership
Size of Wage Change
Member’s Share of 2-Party Vote
WH Change from Member’s Party ln(t)
Member’s Share of 2-Party Vote ln(t)

-1.4250***
(0.1283)
0.6978***
(0.1691)
0.0695
(0.1632)
0.7832***
(0.1747)
-0.0365***
(0.0064)
0.6192***
(0.1883)
1.1965**
(0.5165)
-0.5088**
(0.2171)
-0.9926
(0.6287)

NOTE: N =2,798 congressperson-years with 1,216 subjects and 312 observed failures. Beta values
are coefficients for a Cox proportional hazards conditional risk set model with time measured as time
from entry into the data set. Baseline hazard rates stratified by order of failures (failures beyond
third combined with third strata). Efron method used for tied observations. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
Union membership and vote share are mean-centered variables.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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1

The simulation procedures are easily programmed. An adaptable Stata do-file is available in Appendix II
of supplementary materials on the author’s website.
2
Several very helpful contributions from political methodologists exist to aid in the interpretation of
interaction effects in linear regression, limited dependent variable models, some count models and some
fully parameterized duration models. These include King, Tomz and Wittenberg’s (2000) Clarify software,
Boehmke’s (2006) Stata utility – grinter – for calculating marginal effect of interacted variables, and
the Stata code written by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006).
3
As will be clarified in the examples below, the vital aspect here is not that the effect of a variable is
changing, but that the changing effect of a covariate over time is not proportional to the effects of other
variables.
4
Similar patterns of changing loyalty and support for the executive have been located in Western Europe
(e.g. Warwick 1992).
5
By initial effect, I mean that when t=1 and ln(t)=0.
6
Detailed expositions of the meaning and interpretation of coefficients and standard errors in
multiplicative-interaction models can be found in Freiderich (1982), Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006),
and Kam and Franzese (2007).
7
In nonlinear modeling, however, the marginal effect of X1 will be conditioned by the value of all included
X, not just that with which it is explicitly interacted (Kam and Franzese 2007, 112; Ai and Norton 2003).
8
This computer code is freely available at <http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/interaction.html>. Kam
and Franzese’s (2007) equivalent code is available at the University of Michigan Press page for their book
Modeling and Interpreting Interactive hypotheses in Regression Analysis, as well as at the authors’
personal web pages, including, <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/Publications.html>.
9
To install grinter, open Stata and type the following command:
net from http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/stata/grinter
10
For more detailed discussion of the recovered baseline hazard, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004,
65-66).
11
As there are simpler ways to achieve a substantively interesting means of evaluating the effect of X i,
demonstrating the steps for differentiation is not necessary. Using the product and chain rules, the first
derivative of Equation 4.1 with respect to Xi can be shown to be:
⁄
( )
)
(
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( )
( )
)
( )
)
∑[
( ) (
] (
12
In this calculation, and those to come, I denote t as a constant at value t=t. This is vital for the benefits of
the relative hazard to kick in: if t is not held constant across the hypothetical cases of i and j, then the
baseline hazard will not drop out of the ratio, and a simple quantity will not be located.
13
This measure is also sometimes called the conditional linear coefficient.
14
For this illustration, I simulated 1,000 draws of pairs of β1 and β2 from a normal distribution with
mean values of .5 and -.2, variance of .04 and .02 for each β respectively and covariance -.001.
15
One could also obtain valid confidence intervals by drawing form the variance-covariance matrix and
mean vector of coefficients to simulate a sampling distribution (such techniques will be outlined further
below). This method produces equivalent results to the exponentiation of the combined coefficient.
Evidence supporting this claim can be found in Table A1 and Figure A1 in the appendix of supplementary
materials. The Delta method could also be employed to locate the standard error and confidence intervals
around the relative hazard. For the case at hand, however, this method’s asymptotically-valid linear
approximation is less desirable. Confidence intervals around the relative hazard derived using the Delta
method may include nonsensical values. This can be easily verified by using Stata’s predictnl
command to produce confidence intervals via the Delta method.
16
T will be the number of values of time included in the analysis. If survival times in the original data
range from 1-25 years, for example, T could be 25. If the survival times exhibit a much larger or less
discrete range, however, say from .1-35.8 years, it may be desirable to create T based on the percentiles of
the original distribution. Stata code for either strategy can be found in Appendix II.
17
For 95% “confidence intervals” this will include the 2.5th, 50th and 97.5th percentiles.
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18

Examination of combined coefficients may also prove useful, but these values must be transformed to
lend any substantive appeal.
19
See Figure 1 and the attending discussion above.
20
Of course, there is a limit to this logic. A 50% increase in a probability of .0000002, for example, does
not significantly alter our expectations regarding the likelihood of the event, and is therefore substantively
uninteresting even if it is significant.
21
For example, the counter may be scaled in years, days, months, minutes, seconds, etc. and the time t=1
will be different depending on which is selected.
22
Though the estimated effect may flip from positive to negative (or vice versa) at a certain point in time,
the effect will of course be statistically indistinguishable from zero for some time before and after this
particular point. If desired, the analyst could design a simulation procedure to obtain confidence intervals
around the point, or could use the Delta Method. Of course, this information will also be obtained through
the process of calculating the full NPH effect with the methods described above.
23
For more information on the coding and frequencies of these and other variables in the analysis, see
Golub (2007).
24
To facilitate comparison, the differences here were not multiplied by 100. To see the algebraic similarity
between these two measures, please review Equations 6 and 8.
25
The combined coefficient in this case is (βbacklog + ln(t)βln(t)backlog).
26
The effect is insignificant between the 289th and 1,412th days of deliberation.
27
The deliberation time used here is 2,412 days, which is one standard deviation above the mean
deliberation time.
28
Because intervention is a binary variable, we could calculate the relative hazard and confidence intervals
without simulation simply by exponentiation of this combined coefficient. Unfortunately, the insignificant
combined impact of pro-government intervention in the early stages of civil war duration produced
confidence intervals with extreme values. The chart of the combined coefficient in Figure 4 is more
charitable and readable. These extreme values stem from the uncertainty of the finding, not the method of
obtaining standard errors. Alternate methods, including the Delta method and simulation procedures,
produce analogous results.
29
I report all findings at the significance level utilized by the original authors. In this case, that means a
90% threshold.
30
A typographical error in the published manuscript describes the second PHA-violating variable as
political party rather than mean-centered vote share. A corrected version of Meinke’s (2005) Table 1, as
well as replication data, is available online at < http://www.facstaff.bucknell.edu/smeinke/research.htm>.
31
Two-thirds of observations cluster in the first two years.
32
These outcomes are not equally likely in the data: 5% and 25% occur twice, 75% occurs 160 times, 99%
never. There are, however, a considerable number of uncontested races with vote shares of 100.
33
The “comfortable win” or “safe” position is one standard deviation above the mean, or a vote share of
85.3%. The “not safe” or “plurality” win is two standard deviations below the mean, or 37.3% of the vote
share.
34
All values below the mean are negative numbers, due to mean-centering. The lower value in this case,
then, is added to rather than subtracted from the higher value.
35
Here, the absolute value of the shift between uncontested and comfortable is roughly have that of the
difference between plurality and comfortable (14.7 versus 32.1). The equality of the differences in hazard
ratio suggest that behavior is more sensitive to increases in safety than to decreases in safety, as it takes a
considerably more dramatic shift downward to produce a “symmetric” change in likelihood of voteswitching.

40

